Marek Czajkowski

ZBN Analysis no. 13 (32) / 2018

14 July 2018

2018 Uniwersytet Jagielloński & Marek Czajkowski

The last few months saw many important developments in Syria – the war apparently entered a new phase which appears much more organized and structured. On the so-called “government side” there are key players with well-defined agendas, although none of them is as monolithic as it might seem. The other “side” may be called so only because it consists of actors with more or less anti-Assad attitude, but otherwise they do not share a substantial common ground. When it comes to the Russian Federation, until now it has managed to remain in relatively good terms with all the main participants in the conflict as a sort of an arbiter. This position rests on the ability to communicate and compel/nudge/convince various conflicted sides to agree on solutions desired by the Kremlin. Now, as smaller players such as some independent anti-Assad organizations and the Islamic State (IS) are mostly gone, clashes between bigger ones seem imminent. Therefore, Russia’s role as an intermediary will be more and more difficult. It could even be argued that Moscow will sooner or later be compelled to take sides what will jeopardize its current convenient position. Some observers even notice that it has actually started to happen, and we tend to agree with that assumption.

We think that now it is a good occasion to reconsider the current structure of the Syrian civil war with special attention to Russia’s role. This will also give us a fine opportunity to glance into the future of the Middle East. Therefore, firstly, we will briefly review positions of every major side of the conflict and related probable future developments. Secondly, we will assess the current and prospective situation of the Russian Federation with regard to Syria and beyond.

Syria

The current authorities in Damascus are obviously the main actor in the war that ravages the territory of Syria, because their very existence is at stake – this fact is a basic defining factor of the whole conflict. The Syrian government’s general goal is therefore to stay afloat, conserve power of the ruling elite, and finally to restore the influence it had prior to what we call the Arab Spring. But this refers in full only to President Bashar al-Assad himself, the closest elite of Alawites around him, the majority of state apparatus and command structure of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) with its main regular units. Apart from those players, the so-called “government side” consists of more or less independent actors such as local militias and tribal structures. They also form a sort of mix with political groups related to different entrepreneurial circles firmly anchored within the realm of shadowy businesses that blossom thanks to the war that nurtures instability which in turn greatly facilitates illegal activities.

The Syrian government side is therefore by no means a monolith, it is not even a structure cohesive enough to be able to construct and execute comprehensive long-term plans. As long as hostilities rage through the country, there is an universal factor that binds this group together – the fight against anti-Assad opposition in order to recover the enclaves they occupy. But when this process is over – actually we can see it nearing an end – divergences between interests of these actors will likely resurface with great intensity. Particularly, quasi-independent local forces will try to preserve the already attained freedom of action, because it is functional for their various commercial and political interests in a war-torn, unstable country. The central government has tolerated this situation until now, because it was a price of the local militias’ active support and because it was an inherent and overwhelming effect of destabilization of the country. But now, when the war is drawing to an end of its chaotic phase, the central authority is poised to try to reestablish its control and to subordinate local players, in an economic sense as well. This will surely induce tensions within the pro-Assad camp and will prolong the way to normalization and to rebuilding of the country’s power structures. The government is and will be stronger in this contest, but at least for now it will in many instances be compelled to compromise, what will allow some of independent players to retain at least some control and influence. This dispersion of real power in Syria will be an important obstruction to reestablishment of central authority over the country. Assad’s part of Syria will therefore remain a state with weak central authority in rather long perspective.

The Kurdish Quasi-State in Syria

Aspirations of the Kurdish population are not solely a Syrian issue, as this nation also populates vast areas of Iraq, Iran and especially Turkey. However, thanks to the war in Syria the Kurds managed to take control over a good portion of the country where they established independent administration and state-like authorities. Together with the autonomy in Iraq, it is the second area where the Kurds have created their own national institutions. This process has transformed the whole Middle East to a great extent, even if it is not apparent at the moment. It is because this nation of roughly 30 million (some sources’ estimates are up to 46 million) has reinforced its long-standing quest for independence with a solid material basis on a vast territory with its infrastructure.

On the other hand, it is worth to understand that the Kurdish population is by no means united, neither ideologically nor by organization, despite its relatively strong common identity. The Kurdish national movement is therefore not cohesive neither with regard to the very concept of independence and ways of achieving it nor to its organizational structure. What is more, the territory that Kurdish organizations hold in Syria is not populated by the Kurds alone, many areas even have no substantial indigenous Kurdish population. That is why the institutions that the Kurds have created and military units they have mustered in Syria are not purely Kurdish. They rely strongly on a consent of the Arab population east of the Euphrates River, which is itself divided along various local lines. Thus, an Arab factor within the Kurdish political structure adds to its potential of instability. It may even lead to violent rifts within the Kurdish-held territories which could in turn be used by the Syrian government to get an upper hand there.

Currently, the Kurds in Syria concentrate on reinforcing their positions, having in mind that except the wobbly American backing they have no other external help. They understand that in fact they were left alone, as the U.S. is not a trustworthy partner. This uncertainty and actual solitude of the Kurdish quasi-state in Syria, together with the abovementioned internal tensions, may lead the Kurds to accept political solutions, which would give them some autonomy within al-Assad’s state for the price of accepting his authority. Even if such solution would be viewed as entirely bad or at least imperfect, it could still be considered better than the brutal pacification – an obvious effect of the military disaster that would likely follow a possible all-out government’s offensive.

On the other hand, it is also very likely that in case of renewed fighting or some larger offensive against them, be it Turkish or Syrian, the Kurds would appear to be ready to fight to the bloodiest end. This would result in protracted hostilities, with grave consequences for the Kurds themselves, but also very expensive for assailants and with great potential of spilling over to Turkey or Iraq. The Americans may also prove reliable partner after all and could assist the Kurds in such a situation, at least to a certain extent. The scenario of a long and costly offensive and likely confrontation with the U.S. is probably the factor which deters al-Assad and the Iranians from trying to execute it – the Russians have no interest in fighting the Kurds whatsoever, because of the other reasons which we discuss below.

All in all, the most important attribute of a current position of the Kurdish-run entity in Syria is that it is very unstable with a rather vague view to the lasting outcome that would be both acceptable to the other parties to the conflict and still interesting to the Kurds. Therefore in the foreseeable future the Kurds in Syria will be the most unpredictable and volatile player in all the puzzle.

Iran

There are two widespread explanations regarding the course of Tehran’s policy in the Middle East and beyond. First, the most common narrative provides that Iran is fighting for its great power status and the position of a hegemonic player in the region. Therefore its goals and aims are expansive by nature, and so are all its activities, from building up the armed forces, through developing long-range strike capabilities to foreign interventions. The other argument explains all those activities as an essentially  defensive posture. It is argued, then, that Tehran rightly feels being threatened by the U.S., a global superpower which is actually delegitimizing its very existence – or at least the power of the ruling elite and the political system which have endured for thirty years and is well embedded in the nation’s identity.

However, in the context of the Syrian war it is rather irrelevant whether Tehran’s actions were and are motivated by offensive or defensive purposes. Either way the intervention was bound first place to keep existing regime in power and prevent possible rise of external influence in Syria. The next goal was to use an opportunity to establish Iran’s permanent military presence there. This presence is of high strategic importance, because it means an occasion to generate a significant threat to Israel – this is currently the main rationale of the Iranian venture in Syria. Iran wishes to build a land corridor from its borders to the Mediterranean which will become a priceless strategic resource, no matter whether Tehran’s motivations were defensive or offensive by nature. Stability in Syria is of secondary importance at this point, it may even be assumed that Iran would prefer prolonged destabilisation of the country and weakness of its government – this would undoubtedly make Iranian presence easier to legitimize and enforce.

Thus, we can safely assume that Iran is not only an important but also highly determined and motivated player in Syria and its goals and aims are quite precisely defined – it is however not entirely clear when it comes to some details. When we consider Iran’s engagement in Syria, it is essentially identified with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). This powerful entity is a sort of a state within a state which is in league with the most hard-line political groupings at Iran’s divided political scene. But there are also players that support confrontational policy of the state with less eagerness, and this refers especially to a costly engagement in Syria. Social mood within the nation is also not so belligerent, especially when costs are considered. Furthermore, if the United States succeeded to reintroduce serious regime of sanctions it would substantially reduce Iran’s capability to wage war and contribute to the aggravation of economic woes of the society, possibly giving way to even stronger disenchantment with the Syrian engagement.

On the other hand, Washington’s withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran will probably empower hardliners somewhat, and weaken moderates at the same time. It is because this situation will inflate perception of an external threat, especially that the U.S. is increasingly bent on the regime change in Tehran, what seemingly pose as a kind of the new American grand strategy for the region. This factor will work the opposite way than the abovementioned developments. It is therefore extremely hard to assess a potential for change of the Iranian strategy in Syria.

When we consider Iran as a party to the conflict in Syria we also refer to its numerous allies there. They are such entities as local militias, especially of Shia denomination and multitude of foreign fighters, especially Iran’s long-time staunch ally Hezbollah, which by the way is, according to some reports, somehow war-weary and even divided as to the purpose of its Syrian engagement. The Iranian forces in Syria are therefore not monolithic, but consist of highly motivated IRGC units, battle-hardened foreign fighters with various individual agendas and local warlords that are prone to do their own businesses and take advantage of the existing situation. It is therefore worth to reiterate that many of Iranian proxies, probably including Hezbollah, have somewhat different interests than Tehran itself.

Anyway, in the foreseeable future Iran will remain determined to achieve its goals but it will still encounter a lot of obstacles for its Syrian policies, internal ones included. Specifically, it will continue to build its military presence in Syria, and construct a land corridor to Lebanon, even if the latter has currently become more complicated given that the 2018 elections in Iraq brought to power forces less friendly towards Tehran than those that had been ruling in Baghdad prior to the elections.

Turkey

Until the present year Turkey has been considered to be a rather reluctant party to the conflict. Ankara did voice serious concern and did reiterate its commitment to Syria without al-Assad, but no decisive and substantial policy was implemented with regard to that. This is mostly due to the fact that the Turkish government has always been preoccupied mostly by the Kurdish problem. That is why the only resolute action in Syria was the operation Euphrates Shield that commenced by the end of August 2016 and led to the establishment of the Turkish military presence in Syria. It was supposed to drive a wedge between Kurdish enclaves and prevent them from creating a unified zone of control along almost the entire Turkish-Syrian border. This preoccupation with the Kurds is still the most important feature of the Turkish engagement in Syria, because the aspirations of that nation are viewed in Turkey as an existential threat.

However, since the beginning of 2018 Turkey has come out with a much more active stance in the conflict, aimed against the Kurds, of course, but with wider goals in sights as well. First of all, Ankara acted against small Kurdish enclave of Afrin, located in north-western Syria and bordered by Turkey from two sides. Using a meticulously adopted Russian experience, Turkish forces provided an overwhelming support of artillery, combat and reconnaissance aircrafts, armoured units and special operation forces to well trained, generously equipped and highly motivated fighters belonging to the so-called Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army, which was formed by Turkey and consists mostly of the Arabs and Syrian Turkmen. The province was surprisingly quickly conquered with limited causalities (as for the standards of the Syrian war, of course). Secondly, Turkey begun to augment its presence in Idlib province in Syria which is its zone of responsibility according to deconflicting agreements signed in 2017. Currently the Turkish military moves freely across the most part of the province and possesses 12 permanent observation posts there – one of them is located roughly 7 km from the very center of Aleppo. This way Ankara has greatly strengthened its overall presence and capabilities to influence the situation in Syria. In June 2018 Turkish forces have also entered Manbij province, the swath of land at the Turkish border west of Euphrates, held by the Kurdish forces since 2016. According the agreement brokered by the U.S it is run collectively by the Turks, Americans and French. This is a fine addition to the Turkish entrenchment in Syria, which also show Ankara’s flexibility – it has already displayed its military prowess in Afrin, and here it demonstrates negotiation skills and readiness for some compromise.

Thus, Turkish goals and aims in the Syrian conflict remain two-fold. The most important dimension is of course the Kurdish issue; let us reiterate an important point that this nation’s aspirations are treated by Ankara as a strategic threat. It is mostly because the largest Kurdish minority lives in Turkey and has long tradition of separatist activities. Therefore the Kurdish state-like institutions in Syria are viewed as especially dangerous, and therefore Turkey wants to have its part in the Syrian conflict – to balance Kurdish influence and deter this nation from taking more decisive pro-independence actions. But the second dimension of Turkish engagement, however less exposed is more far-reaching. Ankara wants to give some new breath into its overall strategy of enhancing the influence within the Middle East that has lost its momentum since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Here an active role in Syria makes Ankara an indispensable partner during any peace negotiation and a part of every solution. In turn, the presence in this hottest spot of the Middle East rises Turkish weight as a regional or even transregional player. The volatile political internal situation in Turkey adds to this motivations, because active foreign policy and boosting of the national pride while simultaneously inflating threats is surely a good tool for the Turkish ruling elite to reinforce its power.

Israel

Israel is another country with high stakes in the Syrian conflict. It has strictly defined and crucially important national security interests there. Since its creation, the Jewish State has shaped its identity on the assumption that it is an island on the hostile sea and its inhabitants have virtually nowhere to go. Despite some level of political normalization with some of its neighbours, Israel has remained probably the most security-centric state in the world and Jerusalem’s foreign policy has always been extremely vigilant with readiness to use every means necessary to prevent dangers it has been permanently confronted with.

The first phase of the Syrian conflict might have looked like some kind of relief for Israel. Strong Syria with vast conventional army and links to proxies in Lebanon was surely one of the main foes of the Jewish State – thus its unraveling in the course of a civil war seemed a rather good development. But it soon appeared that otherwise was true, when Iran, with its aggressive anti-Israeli agenda, entered the conflict forcefully and started to use this opportunity to create anti-Israeli infrastructure in Syria.

This way, the Syrian war has become an important source of peril for Israel, precisely because one of its consequences was the Iranian presence dangerously close to the Israeli borders. In fact this situation brought even worse security environment for Israel than it had been before the war. Truly, al-Assad’s Syria was a significant conventional military power, but still far inferior to the Israeli Defence Force, especially since Tel-Aviv prevented Syria from acquiring nuclear weapons. Israel was therefore faced by a more or less predictable enemy, which in fact could not be considered an existential threat. But Iran is a whole different issue. This is a much larger country with vast resources, significant armed forces, and, above all, it has reached the threshold of becoming a nuclear-armed state. Moreover, it is geographically distant, so its core resources and installations are much more secure than the pre-war Syrian overall potential. Iran has also perfected means and strategies of asymmetric warfare – their deployment close to the Israeli borders would be a real game-changer because it would give Tehran the whole new set of opportunities. Using Syrian territory Iran would be able to execute a broad range of low intensity operations, hoping to avoid all-out war but still managing to inflict significant damage on Israel. Thus Tehran could try to disrupt the proper functioning of the Jewish State, causing human and material loses, keeping Israeli forces on constant and costly alert and so on. It would result in possible Israel’s demoralization and overall weakening which in turn could undermine its very existence. That is why the emerging Iranian combat, training and reconnaissance infrastructure in Syria, together with the presence of Iranian proxy Hezbollah radically complicates national security of Israel, rising significant concerns in Tel-Aviv.

Therefore, Israel treats all the situation very seriously and does not hesitate to take direct military actions against Iranian targets in Syria. Until now there have been several Israeli strikes of that sort, including a massive operation of May 10^th 2018, and we can expect more to come. They are not only aimed at reducing the Iranian presence in Syria, preferably to coerce Teheran to withdraw, but they also carry a message to every participant of Middle Eastern affairs, particularly to Russia, that Israel is ready for every contingency and is determined to take any action it would deem necessary. It is a sort of reminder that the State of Israel does not hesitate when it is endangered and is always ready to use even the most radical tactics and the best instruments at its disposal. Note, that the newest American-made F-35 jets, considered as a game-changer with regard to overcoming even the most sophisticated air defenses, were spotted over Lebanon in May.

USA

The United States have traditionally been an important player in the Middle Eastern affairs because of their vital interests that stem out from overall foreign policy and security strategy of the U.S. One may argue, however, that in the recent years those interests became less clear, not only due to less clear strategies, but also thanks to important transformations within the region and on the global stage. In short, there are two profound factors that determine current and perspective significance of the Middle East. Firstly, the region is a subject to gigantic internal strains that induce extreme and therefore impossible to predict changes. Secondly, global economic and technological developments have rendered hydrocarbons somewhat less important than they have been until now – and this process is poised to continue. Thus, the importance of the Middle East for the U.S. has diminished to a certain extent in the last years both economically and in terms of geostrategy. Further advance of this process is difficult to predict in detail, but we may generally assume that it will continue.

At first, the U.S. took rather reluctant stance in the Syrian conflict, what was caused in the first place by apparent assumption made by President Obama that there was no satisfactory endgame that would have warranted substantial American engagement from a risk/reward perspective. However, the U.S. did adopt an anti-Assad position, supporting some of the anti-government groupings, but in fact the Americans got engaged in Syria more forcefully only from 2014, when the campaign against the Islamic State (IS) commenced. This happened first of all because the rise of IS was considered a significant threat to the United States. It also posed a convenient, tangible target – the Caliphate had well defined territory and infrastructure that could have been targeted the way the U.S. liked the most (precision strikes, special forces operations, etc.). The United States also managed to secure broad international consensus with regard to action against the Islamic State – non-existent in terms of the other, especially anti-Assad undertakings. In this campaign the Americans relied greatly on the Kurdish forces as their “boots on the ground” – this also resulted in the creation of the aforementioned Kurdish quasi-state east of Euphrates.

The latest developments herald a shift in the American Middle Eastern policy, aimed at a more active stance against Iran. This country is strongly securitized by Washington, mainly because of internal reasons, and emerges as a central threat when the Islamic State has mostly been vanquished. Therefore it should be expected that the U.S. position in Syria will be maintained, as they pose significant obstacle to the Iranian influence – at this point the common interests of the U.S. and Israel are well visible. But on the other hand, it cannot be taken for granted, because the American policy has become much less predictable, if not erratic, as it used to be. We may therefore expect many turns, or even u-turns, sometimes irrational ones, usually tactical or superficial, making any assessment of the United States’ policy particularly difficult.

Russia

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow abruptly lost almost all the influence its predecessor had had all over the world, Middle East included. Syria remained one of the last outposts of the traditional Russian position in this region, although the connections were not as strong as before, when Damascus was the recipient of the substantial Soviet military aid, political backing and economic assistance. Already in the 21^st century Russia managed to slowly augment its position resuming some economic and military assistance although on much more market-oriented terms. All in all, by the end of the 2000s, Syria remained Russia’s close ally, the one of that sort in this crucial region. Its role was even more profound in the light of overall Moscow’s strategy aimed on restoring Russia’s superpower status. To do that it needed influence throughout the world, especially in important regions like the Middle East. It is no wonder then that the Kremlin was deeply concerned when friendly regime of Bashar al-Assad became threatened by popular anti-government movement. From the very beginning of the Syrian uprising Moscow has provided Damascus with political backing and military aid – finally, faced with the prospect of an almost certain fall of the Syrian dictator, it decided to openly intervene by force. Of course Russian motivations were much wider and multi-faceted; we have covered that issue several times before. In short, it is a part of a wider, deeply-rooted confrontation between Russia and the West which Moscow puts in an increasingly ideological perspective.

Currently, the Russian position in Syria seems to be on the one hand very good, but on the other it is apparently somehow questionable. At a glance, a remarkable feature catches the eye: Russia has emerged as a sort of arbiter in the conflict that is able to remain in good terms with all the parties. As a result, it is frequently argued, Russia became a key playmaker that decides how the situation in Syria evolves. That is true to a great extent, as the help the Russians provided to al-Assad – logistic support, training of the SAA and use of own combat units – was one of the two factors that shored up Syrian president (the second one was Iranian help in form of shipments of military aid and presence of Tehran-affiliated ground forces). This way Russia indeed built itself a very strong position as the regional player.

As we have described above, there are now three “cantons” of Syria, none of which is monolithic or unified, but they are much stronger than any of former rebel enclaves. There is also a significant Iranian presence scattered within the government-held part. With these developments, the phase of relatively easy Russian military victories, achieved with the use of numerous cannon-fodders like SAA, local militias or Hezbollah fighters supported by Russian artillery and air force, is drawing to an end. These successes were also possible thanks to relatively weak equipment and organization of various competing rebel groupings. Furthermore Russia, as a de facto dictatorship, was able to dismiss or hide its own expenditures and combat losses at least to a certain extent. It could also executed a massacre on the Syrian civilian population, because this issue was practically absent in Russian information space. It is also worth to reiterate what we have often claimed, that the Syrian operation and its successful conduct is very important for legitimization of the current authorities in Russia – that is why a picture of the conflict is being meticulously constructed by the very effective propaganda apparatus.

The situation evolves, however, as we have recently argued, and some of its features appear to be not exactly positive for the Russians. Essentially, two most general developments may endanger the position that Russia gained in Syria and in the Middle East as a whole, what in turn may have an impact on Moscow’s position in the world.

1. The current phase of the Syrian conflict is characterized the most distinctly by consolidation of the three main “cantons” and the Iranian presence within al-Assad’s territory. Therefore open hostilities tend to fade away, last rebel enclaves disappear, either under brutal force, like some parts of Eastern Ghouta, or due to the negotiated solution, as it happened in the Homs area. Therefore the need for sheer force, an overwhelming rain of fire designed to pave the way to conquer territories, diminishes. Instead, the need for the boots on the ground to hold, clear and, moreover, stabilize conquered areas is on the rise. Simply speaking, when guns go silent, at least for a time being, those who wield them are less important than those who can contribute to post-conflict management, stabilization and reconstruction. Here Russia’s role is set to decline, because it can contribute to requirements of the situation only to a certain extent, for example by providing some military police for deconflicting purposes or reconnaissance capabilities to help restore the government’s authority. At this point the real limits of Russian engagement come into the forefront, especially when we compare Russia’s motivations and capabilities to the other external players. Turkey and Iran, not to mention Israel, have well defined existentially important stakes in that conflict. So the former are ready and willing to dedicate vast human and material resources to the tasks that current phase of the conflict invokes, and the latter is watchfully guarding its vital security interests. In addition, the Russians’ motivations and their commitments in the region are simply weak, despite the fact that Moscow sees its interests there as highly important from the point of view of general foreign policy strategy and internal politics. But in fact there are no existential stakes for Russia in the Middle East. Together with geographic remoteness, it makes Moscow unable to commit the resources that are mostly needed in Syria – thousands of disciplined soldiers to control and stabilize cities, countryside and deserts, or significant economic aid necessary for reconstruction of demolished infrastructure. That is why the players which were until now depended on Russia may start to emancipate, because they are less and less in need of what Russia can provide them with. 

2. The above mentioned situation refers to one of the two possible scenarios of future developments in Syria, which is more or less permanent “cantonization” of Syria, but there is another one – a clash of the main forces that are present in Syria now. We have often argued that the division of Syria is a Russia-preferred scenario, sort of endgame, even if it brings some adverse effects for Moscow – more and more observers tend to agree with that. It means maintaining a relative weakness of the Syrian Government that makes it be strongly dependent on Moscow. We might even say that the last thing Russia wishes to happen is the come-back of a strong, unified Syrian state. Such an entity  would be entirely different kind of client than the present regime which is holding just a part of its own country and remains endangered with its very existence. What is more, such a situation gives Russia the permanent position of arbiter needed by all of the concerned players, be it Kurds, Iran, Israel, Turkey, or the U.S., to upkeep the balance. But it is unclear if such a complex system of multilateral balance is sustainable. It is even questionable if it is possible to establish it at all. There are two key reasons for that. Firstly, the main players represent entirely contradictory interests and aspirations which are extremely difficult to bridge – necessary compromises may be unsatisfactory for any or even for all sides involved. Thus some of them can venture to break the status quo preferred by Russia, because they may view it as unbearable deadlock. This would in turn destroy the artificial balance made by Kremlin and would compel Russia to take sides – if Moscow did not do just that, it would be surely condemned to marginalization. Secondly, the parties to the conflict may not decide to fight one another but may be compelled or dragged into one, either by unwanted escalation, or due to actions of groups that are not fully controlled, or nudged to battle due to internal developments. For example, it is conceivable that another trial to take an industrial area of Deir-ez-Zor from the Kurdish hands by some mercenary/local militia force with support of some SAA units would make the U.S. forces clash with Syrian government, what would escalate in a wider conflict along U.S./Kurdish - Syrian government axis. In other areas, Kurdish-Turkish or Israeli-Iranian unwanted escalations of confrontation are also quite possible.

Current tensions between Iran and Israel are a sort of a harbinger of things to come. The Russians are trying to broker a deal, what apparently is working, providing that Iranian and Hezbollah forces will not be present at the Israeli border. That meant for example that they should not have taken part in a taking over of the rebel held Quneitra/Daraa region bordering the Golan Heights. It was strongly demanded by the Israelis who possessed very capable forces there that could make difficult or even deny any action in that area. On the one hand, it is an example of Russia’s role as an arbiter, but simultaneously it points to important limitations of this position. Truly, it allowed the Syrian government to take over the next rebel enclave, using combination of force and negotiations. But on the other hand it is just a tactical move that does not change anything, it only puts off a danger of immediate Iran-Israeli confrontation. Despite this achievement, Iran will continue to entrench in Syria, because this is in its crucial interest. And Israel will be striking Iranian infrastructure and assets. Moreover, the agreement seems to be more or less anti-Iranian, favouring Israel and seemingly giving Tel-Aviv a sort of free hand in attacking Iranian targets in Syria while at the same time limiting Iran’s freedom of action. This may further contribute to distance Tehran from Moscow, especially given that the Iranians understand well that the Russians also greatly benefit from new sanctions against Iran, thanks to the rise of the prices of hydrocarbons and a delay of Iran’s meaningful enter to the natural gas market. But Russia cannot limit Iranian actions in Syria according to its own liking, because Iranian stakes are, as we have mentioned, existentially important for them from a point of view of national security and general foreign policy. Tehran has also favorable geographical position and cannot simply give away the opportunity to set itself up on the Israeli border. Such abandonment would mean that its whole engagement there, together with the committed resources, would become senseless. Iran will therefore surely continue what it is currently doing, maybe less ostensibly but with the same aim in sight. It is then destined to move against Russia while maintaining/expanding its footprint in Syria. And what can Moscow do in that situation? Not much – the Iranians do and will probably do essentially what they wish to achieve their goals in Syria, even if it would invoke a strong Israeli response. The Russians do not have good tools to convince or coerce them otherwise. Furthermore, if Israel decided to attack Iranian targets in Syria, would it limit to what the Russians would actually allow? Or it would do whatever it wished, even bombing all the Iranian targets throughout Syria? Can the Russians prevent it? Until now in most of the cases the Russians even could not have intervened because of operational reasons and of geographical restraints – the Russian air defence is located around their permanent installations in north-western Syria. If Russia wanted to deter Israelis form riding against Iranian infrastructure across all the Syrian territory, it would have to increase the number of their air defence assets substantially and to establish their positions in at least several crucial spots. Furthermore, what if the Russian air defence, when finally used, would become much less effective against the Israeli Air Force than it is usually portrayed?

All of this, and a number of other considerations, represent deep strategic predicament the Russians would face if Syria or Iran asked for protection against rampaging Israeli forces. It essentially represents the classic “to shoot or not to shoot” dilemma. In the first case, it would mean an open conflict with Israel which possesses firepower far superior than the Russians have in this remote region. Even the nuclear blackmail will not work, for Israel has means to deliver powerful, maybe even overly debilitating, nuclear strike against Russia. Moscow is in fact in a lost position in such a situation. But if the Russians refuse to defend their allies, they would lose credibility and would risk being sidelined.

Considerations of this kind refer also to the other possible actions of the other main sides to the conflict – for example Turkey. It is usually said that the Russians allowed the Turkish action over the skies of Afrin. But could they have denied it in the face of a firm call from Ankara, the capital of  NATO’s member state?

Conclusions

Russia is and will in foreseeable future remain an important player in Syria, there is no doubt about it, even if its position will diminish to an extent. It is currently an indispensable broker of a stability it has tried and is still trying to establish in the “cantonized” Syria and it benefits from this a lot, with the perspective of gaining much more profits. But it is unable to provide a substantial post-conflict assistance in military and economic terms, and this is one of the reasons that its relevance is poised to be reduced somewhat. Using its influence Russia may actually manage to create and maintain a balance in divided Syria not only in a short-term perspective but also in a longer timeframe. This would also mean the maintenance of Moscow’s favourable position in Syria and in the Middle East as a whole, with the prospect of a relatively slow decline of the position in Syria and even some growth of relevance elsewhere. But, still, the biggest obstacle of real enlargement of influence will be the relatively small soft power of Russia in terms of financial assistance or investment – for Russia itself is a poor country in a permanent economic crisis. Its intention is rather to rip the benefits from the Middle East for itself instead of investing there for the sake of a long-term regional development.

However, if this “multi-polar” intra-Syrian stability between a number of internal and external actors that the Russians bet on is not achieved, if confrontation between them breaks out, Moscow will be cornered into a very difficult position. It will be forced either to take sides, what will surely cost a lot, or to stand down and be marginalized, what will cost less but will mean a sharp decline of influence and benefits derived of it. Considering the first of those options, we must remember that the famed A2/AD bubble with the center in the Russian-held areas of Syria, together with strike assets present there, although painted as sort of invincible Moscow’s supercarrier in the Middle East, are no such thing. Russian positions are strategically impossible to hold against the well-equipped and determined enemy, Tel-Aviv bluntly reminded this to the Russians. Israel itself would be able, although probably with some losses, to eradicate the Russian assets in the region within few hours. The Israelis have recently sent Moscow a sort of explicit warning, publishing a video depicting the destruction of the newest and portrayed as invincible, Russian-made, SAA-operated Pantsir-S1 SAM system by an Israeli missile in May this year. The second option means, let us reiterate, an automatic sidelining of Russia as the main player in the conflict. This vision is less apocalyptic than the first one, of course more pragmatic, more likely too, but it also means huge Russian losses, this time political, both on the international and internal arenas. It would also put in question the very sense of effort and cost of the three-year engagement.

Let us stress, Russia indeed gained a lot in terms of influence and benefits, skillfully navigating difficult Middle Eastern waters – and it may remain a crucial actor there. But it may also be argued that all the Russian engagement to date has been a huge deception of weak power that displays the strength it does not possess – we tend to agree with that assessment. This may pay off, because for many reasons there may be no one to call this a bluff. But the other players have very high stakes on the table and some may finally make a check – it might also be executed gradually without dramatic events. It might have even already started to happen. Did Turkey or Israel ask Russia not to use their air defence assets against them? Or they simply informed Moscow of their intentions leaving it with the “to shoot or no to shoot” dilemma.

We think that we are currently in a sort of inflection point. The next six months will show if the balance is held and Russia remains an arbiter with rising sway within the Middle East, or if its position has started to erode due to the changing dynamics of the conflict in Syria.