Russian Influence in Syria is Poised to Diminish
ZBN Commentary No 4 (28) / 2018
18 February 2018
© 2018 Uniwersytet Jagielloński & Marek Czajkowski
As we have argued many times, Russia intends to stay in Syria indefinitely to exert its influence throughout the Middle East. But the Kremlin does not intend to patch up a permanent solution to bring lasting order and tranquility to the region. Moscow’s actions do not indicate any long-term political strategy of that sort – conversely, it seems that the Russians are rather gearing up for a prolonged low-intensity conflict. Apparently they are prepared merely to respond to the changing situation and rising opportunities to collect tactical gains, relying on a firm foundation of the military infrastructure, as well as political and economic ties. We think that this is the strategy of choice that Russia is and will be pursuing in the Middle East – it is expected to bring good profit for reasonable price.
There are, however, several trends that might undo this plan, at least partially, because the environment in which it is executed has become extremely complex and thus unpredictably unstable. The Russian policy routine in Syria is based on the premise that Moscow is and will be able to successfully manipulate the parties to the conflict, exploiting abundant disagreements among them. Truly, there is a great potential to effectively use the divide et impera strategy, utilizing contradictions between the Syrian government, different rebel groups, the Kurds, Turkey, Iran, the U.S., Israel, other countries of the region and a number of players from outside. But it is also a very delicate situation in which actors may act unexpectedly, or may not agree with contingencies devised in the Kremlin to deal with certain situations. Moreover, and this is tremendously important, some players’ interests are much more vital for them that the Russian involvement is for Russia. Therefore, they are and will be willing to devote proportionally more resources and they surely would do that with greater determination. Such countries as Iran, Turkey or Israel whose stakes are much higher than Russian will surely pursue their goals relentlessly, circumventing Moscow wherever it would be possible.
More specifically, we can clearly point at the following developments in Syria that may be considered a sort of harbingers of things to come with respect to the Russian influence.
1. In January 2018 Turkey launched an offensive in Afrin province in north-western Syria controlled by the Kurdish forces that were labeled by Ankara as terrorists and considered grave threat to country’s security. Obviously, this operation could not have been executed without Russia’s consent as it took place within an area commonly considered Russian exclusive zone of air control. We thought by that time that Moscow agreed on the Turkish offensive at the price of Ankara’s tacit consent to liquidation of a rebel-held enclave in Idlib province (it was a Turkish zone of responsibility according to deconfliction agreements reached last summer). The price seemed very steep for Turkey precisely because many of the rebel groups present in the province had been until then supported by it – abandoning them could have had serious negative consequences for Ankara. It was therefore widely considered a very positive development for Russia.
The situation may of course still evolve the way described above, but current events suggest otherwise. The Turkish forces, strongly relying on subordinate Syrian rebel militias, apparently fare much better than expected in Afrin while simultaneously beefing up the presence in Idlib. There is a number of reinforced Turkish observation points there, continuously supplied by truck convoys that operate seemingly unhindered. Therefore it looks like Ankara is not going to withdraw from Iidlib, just the opposite, while at the same time the Syrian army’s offensive there looks like it lost its momentum.
The new interpretation that emerges out of the abovementioned developments differs from the traditional one. As Turkey is up to the existential threat that the Kurds pose (in Turkish eyes of course), the stakes are much higher for it than for Moscow. It is therefore quite likely that the Turks forced the Russians to agree on the operation in Afrin without granting significant concessions. Russia had in fact no choice but to consent, otherwise it would risk alienating Turkey, the country with strong regional position marked by its potential and geography. Therefore it seems that it is Ankara that managed to round Moscow up into a no-win-situation. If the events evolve further this way, it will mean a considerable increase of Turkey’s influence in Syria in expense of Russia’s one.
2. The widely commented clash at Deir ez-Zor is another incident that may be interpreted as a sign of Moscow’s weakness. Setting aside all the uncertainties, the fact is that Syrian government affiliated forces were directly and ruthlessly vanquished by the Americans. What is especially important, a venture by pro-Assad militia and Russian mercenaries was apparently unsanctioned by the Russian military, because Russia had no interest to antagonize the Americans and the Kurds at the moment. What is more, an assault of battalion-size battle group was ill prepared and poorly conducted, contrary to the established pattern of Russian operations. And finally, muted reaction of the Russian authorities may also indicate that they did not sanction Deir ez-Zor raid.
If this action, probably aimed at seizing important assets connected with oil production, was actually not cleared with Russian command it indicated growing independence of Syrian forces. It might also signal the new phase of the battle for energy resources with new actors employing modes of operation that are more difficult to control by top authorities. This is another sign of Russian diminishing influence that manifests itself in worsening effectiveness of control developments on the ground.
3. And finally, we can currently observe how the conflict between Iran and Israel morphs from proxy war into more and more direct engagement along tangible frontlines. It seems that for Iran it is vitally important to establish its presence at the Israel’s border and it is resolute to seize the opportunity to do just that. In fact it has been the price for Iran’s costly engagement in Syria and Tehran will simply not let the chance to slip away. Iran is undoubtedly determined to establish a logistic link to Lebanon and keep it open, at least for a time being. But to make it really useful and reliable it must not depend on other actors’ will, what entails the creation of a land corridor physically controlled by Iran. This in turn requires a robust military presence with appropriate chain of fixed bases and all the means to defend it. Doing so, the Iranians are more and more settled in Syria, and given that their presence is more and more sustainable and self-sufficient, the Russian influence wanes. Moscow simply has no means to block Tehran’s expansion, the Russians can neither coerce nor convince the Iranians to limit their presence further that they want it by themselves. So, Tehran will reassert itself in Syria by fait accompli, and the Russians will just have to swallow it – the other choice would mean a conflict with Tehran, something that the Russians certainly are not prepared for.
The Iranian advancement will of course pose an alleviated threat for the Israelis who are very pragmatic about their security – current co-operation with the Russians shows that well. But they are also very vigilant and if they feel existentially threatened they will respond with whatever means they will deem necessary. And again, if Israel decides to step up an action against Iran and its proxies in Syria, Russia will be faced with a bitter dilemma: move against the Israelis or stand down. The first option is out of the question, because the Kremlin knows that the Israelis, when rounded into a corner would not hesitate to use all the hardware they have. In the worst-case scenario, this would result in the destruction of key Russian military assets, especially air-defence systems – even if Israel would have to pay some price for it. Thus, in case of Israel’s incursion into Syria against Iranian forces, the Russians will have to remain in sidelines; at best they will be able to score some tactical gains should opportunity arise. Hence, the rising Iran’s importance in Syria, coupled with growing threat to Israel is another factor that makes Russian influence less relevant.
In conclusion, we might reiterate that some of current developments suggest that Moscow’s influence in Syria has gone through its climax and is about to diminish. Russia’s help was the most important when its sheer firepower, sophisticated intelligence capabilities, specialized support units and logistics assistance were the decisive factors at the battlefield. Now, when the main actors position themselves for post-conflict phase or for a new conflict of much less intensive character, Russia is confronted with rather tough choices. Either it conflicts with other actors, trying to prevent them from gaining to much sway, or it lets them go, thus winding down its own capabilities to act. The first option is rather difficult to imagine, because Russia cannot openly stand against the Turks (with the U.S. and NATO), Kurds (with the U.S.), Israelis (with the U.S.) or even Iranians. Therefore, Moscow is in a position that its best assets are no longer so much needed and thus it gradually loses the relevance. Soon it may find itself with not much to do outside its enclave in north-western Syria, which by the way is a very exposed and difficult position in case of serious hostilities.
Only one thing could change this rather bleak picture: a sort of Marshall Plan a lá Putin, massive financial and economical aid with a shower of billions of dollars. When big guns become irrelevant big money might buy the influence and make Moscow be indispensable partner again. But Russia simply does not have that kind of money and will rather not have it in future.
Photo credit: Middle East Online, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=87281