In October 2018 the Kremlin decided to provide the Syrian Arab Army with the sophisticated air defence system S-300. As of mid-November much is still unknown about key characteristics of the given variant and of the number and location of its elements. It is, however, often said, especially in the Russian media, that this weapon has the potential to prevent Israeli Air Force from attacking the Iranian targets in Syria. Furthermore, many experts draw the opposite conclusions, pointing at political, operational and technical constrains of utility of the S-300s in the Syrian airspace.

Marek Czajkowski

ZBN Commentary no. 12 (36)/2018

7 November 2018

 

On 17 September 2018 a missile fired from the S-200 air defence system belonging to the Syrian armed forces mistakenly downed the Russian Ilyushin Il-20 intelligence gathering and electronic warfare aircraft. This incident took place over the Eastern Mediterranean, off the shores of Syria during an air raid conducted by the Israeli Air Force (KheilHaAvir) against targets located in the Syrian coastal province of Latakia. On the political level, the Russian initial reaction was somewhat muted, in his immediate response President Putin blamed a chain of accidental circumstances that led to the accident, but he did threaten Israel with retaliation as well. Soon the Russian rhetoric heated up and grave accusations by the Russian military were followed by the threat to interfere with Israeli targeting and navigation devices.

A few days later, on 24 September, a more substantial Russian reaction came in the form of  declaration by the defence minister Sergei Shoigu that Syria would be provided with a sophisticated surface-to-air weapons system, the Russian-made S-300. Unlike previous political gestures and tough-worded threats, this fact mightactually change much in the course of the Syrian conflict, but it may also turn out to be only a political demonstration with no real significance. Even though we do not now many details necessary to fully analyze the new reality created by the appearance of a novel weapon in the Syrian arsenal, we may at least try to preliminarily guesstimate some of its possible consequences.

The S-300 – a brief introduction

The systems known under the designation S-300 form a vast family of air defence weapons which entered inventories of the Soviet armed forces by the end of the 1970s. Since their introduction they have been widely considered a formidable weaponry, but as the devil is in details it is worth to study some technicalities that may shed a light on the issue embedded in the title of this piece.

The primary division of the S-300 includes three subfamilies. The S-300W (aka S-300V) was designed for use by land forces as they move a great number of units during combat operations. The S-300F was installed on capital ships of the Soviet Navy in order to provide long-range protection to large task forces of surface combatants. And the S-300P was supposed to form a backbone of the air defence network and to guard the strategic military, political and economic infrastructure. All of these systems share some components and were built according to similar operational concepts, nevertheless they are basically different branches of the family. What concern us is the S-300P and we will refer exclusively to this very system further on.

Originally fielded in 1978, the S-300P was designed as a strategic air defence system with long-range interceptors, highly effective phased-array radars and high-capacity automated fire control system. It consists of mobile launchers, radar stations, command and control posts, resupply and support vehicles which can be transported and deployed very quickly. All the components are mounted either on truck trailers or on high-mobility wheeled chasses which are able to utilize locations that lack solid road infrastructure.

The S-300’s primary unit is a battery (дивизион) that consists of up to 12 launchers (пусковая установка) plus command&control and support infrastructure. Note that apart from a standard acquisition and fire control radar array each battery may be equipped with additional sensors: a primary acquisition array or/and a special radar designed to detect low flying objects like cruise missiles. Therefore any given battery may have very different capabilities, not only because of different number of launchers (for example standard export version consist of 4 launches, however Russian forces’ дивизион has 8 of them), but also due to different composition of sensors. One battery can simultaneously engage 6 targets such as airplanes, cruise missiles and ballistic missiles using 2 interceptors for each of them. Maximum firing range is reported as 150 km for older variants or 200 km for the newest.

Regiment (полк) is a higher level of organization of S-300 units. It may be  composed of 3-6 batteries, the Russians commonly use a configuration with 3 of them. A regiment is typically equipped with regimental level radar and control system, introduced in later variants, which link batteries together to form a unified system that can track up to hundred air targets and fire 72 missiles at 36 of them. Note that every regiment is an integrated combat unit which may be scattered around vast area. Each battery may be deployed as far as 30 km away from regimental command center, or even further when relay stations are used. A fully deployed Russian-style полк of S-300s may protect the area of over 150 000 square km – it is of course a strictly theoretical figure based on a simple equation including maximum firing range of the system.

In forty years from its initial deployment the S-300 has undergone a multitude of upgrades, some of them minor, some others substantial enough to justify new designations for the improved product. Therefore, there is a number of variants designed P, PS, PT, PM, PMU in service in Russia and in some fifteen other countries. Basically, they form two main generations: The first one, the P/PT/PS/PM/PMU, was introduced in number of variants in the 1980s (the PMU was an export version presented in 1992). These weapons are known in the West as SA-10 (U.S. DoD designation) or Grumble (NATO reporting name). The second generation, SA-20 or Gargoyle, was fielded in the 1990s and comprised of PM-1/2 for the Russian forces and export variants PMU-1/2. The PMU-2 is also known as Favorit and along with its domestic counterpart PM-2 is the most sophisticated variant of the system. Of course, since its introduction in 1997 subsequent production lots of this generation systems were also upgraded, especially with regard to radar accuracy, electronic warfare capabilities and the capacity of a computer system.

This multitude of variants, along with flexibility of the system’s composition and the fact that any given launcher may fire at least several different types of missiles make any assessment of the capability of a certain battery or regiment very difficult. To do that we would have to know not only a full designation but also actual composition of a sensor suite, number of launchers and the types of missiles installed and those kept in storage. It is in fact impossible to do that with the use of open-source information which is not only inherently imprecise andincomplete but also often manipulated.

It also has to be noticed that effectiveness of every weapons system that operates with the use of the electromagnetic spectrum is strongly related to natural limitations of EM waves propagation, such as terrain and physical properties of the atmosphere. The latter is also subject to constant fluctuations due to the weather and solar activity. As anti-aircraft systems rely heavily on electromagnetic waves for detection, guidance and communication, these natural constrains to their operation are of paramount significance.

But even more important are those disturbances within the EM spectrum that are artificially created. Electromagnetic warfare is surely less spectacular than physical combat and so it is often downplayed. But in fact it is equally important, because prevailing against enemy’s capabilities which employ EM frequencies render its combat equipment largely useless and paves the way to the final victory. Thus, the offensive and defensive potential for the electromagnetic war and the capacity of detection, guidance, navigation and communication equipment to operate in the electronic warfare environment are crucial from the point of view of the modern battle, especially the one that takes place in the air.

Simply speaking, the ability of an air-defence system to operate under the assault of jamming and spoofing devices is crucial for its overall effectiveness. But unfortunately we cannot assess it because the related capabilities are, understandably, the most carefully guarded secrets. Only an outcome of the given combat situation may shed some light on the efficiency of the systems involved. But the S-300s have never been battle tested so we do not know how exactly they would operate in the reality of the electromagnetic warfare.

The bottom line of technical considerations is that the S-300 is surely a formidable weapon, especially in its latest variants. But often–quoted ranges of fire and theoretically calculated hit ratios may have not much in common with actual effectiveness of the given system’s configuration in a given combat environment.

Operational Realities

When the Russians triumphantly announced their decision to provide Syria with S-300 many media outlets were quick to present purported kill zone of the system as plain circle of a 200-km radius with Damascus at its center. It was also often suggested that the Israeli Air Force will find the continuation of its operations in Syria at least very difficult. But there are many questions that we would have to answer to determine if these assumptions are correct.

First of all, we do not know much about an actual composition of the S-300’s units sent to Syria, and what variant actually it is. Moreover, as the system is modular it may be set up in many different ways with components from different variants – there are many discrepancies in the already published information, which may very well be false or deliberately misleading. Hence, we do not know even an exact number of launchers and other elements of the system. Is it a battery? How many launchers per battery? A regiment? How many batteries? What is more, we can only guess what generation of fire and control system and what kind of missiles have Syrians been provided with. Especially important is the actual capability of given radar and communications subsystems to work properly in the case of the use of sophisticated electronic warfare capabilities that are probably the most important factor of Israel’s air dominance in the Syria’s skies.

Adding some geographical constrains and uncertainty as to the location of the system’s components, we do not know how large area will be controlled or effectively defended by it. We also do not know if the Russians decide to plug the Syrian system in their own highly capable air defence network; specifically, will they be willing to actively assist in bringing down Israeli jets.? The level of training and motivation of Syrian air-defence crews is also unknown – the newly–acquired S-300s may even be operated by Russians or with the help of the Russian advisers. With regard to that, it is safe to assume that as long as the Syrian crews complete their training with the new equipment it will be operated by the Russian soldiers. This would make a situation very delicate because every attack on the Syrian S-300s would bring a possibility of inflicting losses among the Russian personnel. On the other hand, it is also debatable if the Russian crews would be ordered to fire upon Israelis with the likelihood that a Russian operator would kill an Israeli pilot. Such an event would be very dangerous and could have consequences difficult to imagine.

The bottom line with regard to operational realities of the new Syrian S-300s is that, simply speaking, we do not know what exactly and where is to be deployed. Thus, basing on open sources we cannot assess actual capabilities of the system which is going to operate somewhere in Syria. What is more, despite the Russian propaganda which portrays S-300s and other domestic air defence systems as unbeatable, we should remain skeptical about the effectiveness of the Syrian S-300s, as well as we should not write it off  yet. It may turn out to be a highly efficient weapon, very hard to be avoided, and with the ability to protect a large part of Syria from a number of firing positions. But it could also turn to be limited and less efficient – annoying but with no substantial effect on actual regional balance, supposed to be mostly of political significance.

Israel’s Response

First of all it must be noted that the operations in Syria against Iranian targets are of paramount importance for Israel as we have argued many times. The Iranian presence at the Jewish State’s borders poses existential threat to it, the one of magnitude not seen for several decades. It is because Tehran considers it strategically important to be able to threaten Israel’s territory with the rain of missiles and other asymmetric response in case of possible air attack against Iran. In general, it could offset overall military advantage of Israel versus Iran, and that is why the Iranians consider the deployment of their forces close to Israel’s borders the main prize for their costly involvement in the Syrian civil war, as we have also argued. And it is precisely why the capability to wage the air war against Iran in Syria is a matter of life and death for the Israelis – at least it is portrayed so.

So, if it is essential for Iran to build up its forces in Syria and it is even more essential for Israelis to counteract that development, we may safely assume that Israel will continue the execution of various combat missions against the Iranian targets in Syria and the Syrian air defence infrastructure. These operations may be limited somehow for the time being or otherwise constrained for good, but will continue – there is even an information that the Israeli forces have already resumed their combat actions in Syria.

Before the Ilyushin Il-20 incident, aircrafts belonging to Kheil Ha Avir roamed the Syrian skies freely. Under deconfliction agreement the Israelis notified its forces’ actions to the Russians and were allowed to operate within firing zones of the air defence network which had been established to protect the Russian contingent in Syria. It does not really matter whether this agreement was forced on Moscow by Tel-Aviv or agreed upon as mutually beneficial – what matters is that it proved to be binding. Thus, the Syrian, mostly outdated, air defence system was fighting the Israeli Air Force with little effect, and the Russians were waiting on the sidelines.

However, the S-300, a potentially very powerful weapon, after being put into service within the Syrian defence lines, may bring about a radical change in the military situation. This makes it so important to fully assess capabilities, composition and location of the newly–acquired Syrian wunderwaffe. Its ability to augment Syrian defences and limit Israeli actions will be crucially important for the regional power balance and the course of the Syrian civil war.

Despite the Russian propaganda and contrary to popular stereotype, it is believed in Israel that the S-300 may be defeated or even destroyed if the Israelis decide so. Some analyzes even argue that Israel’s newly–acquired stealth fighters, the F-35I Adirs, may take out the S-300s with relative ease. In May 2018, the Israeli Air Force confirmed that these planes had already conducted combat missions in undisclosed locations. Note that Kheil Ha Avir were trained against the S-300, however it was an older and certainly less capable variant – the PMU-1 operated by the Hellenic Air Force and stationed in Crete.

It is of course very difficult to assess the real ability of the Israeli forces to overcome the S-300. It depends not only on capabilities of the deployed defence systems vs capabilities of offensive weapons, although it is surely crucial. Another question is: What will be the real capabilities of the S-300 considering its actual location/locations. In other words, to what extent it will effectively disturb Israelis in their missions against the most crucial targets. This will be the main issue the Israelis will have to think over before making choice to either try to overcome the S-300s or simply avoid it. The same goes with an ultimate decision to destroy the system, possibly even killing Russians – it will depend on the value of targets protected by the system at the very moment.

The Russians’ Stake

The first impression regarding the Russian side of the story is that Russia just used the opportunity to limit rampaging Israeli air campaign. The downing of the Russian plane was a kind of crossing the red line that angered the Kremlin and prompted Putin to rebalance Israeli presence in Syria which was regarded too intensive. These arguments are consistent with our general opinion that the Russians want to freeze the Syrian conflict at its present stage and balance its participants against one another indefinitely. It would be logical for the Russians to limit the Israelis’ activities following the period of relative freedom of operation they enjoyed in Syria. Their increasingly aggressive behaviour was a sort of challenge to the Russian rule, but Moscow could not have acted directly against Israel because of some obvious reasons. Therefore, the downing of Il-20 was a sort of blessing for the Russians who used it as a pretext to strengthen their Syrian allies and rebalance the overall situation.

However, bringing the S-300s into possible combat situation has more ramifications than it meets the eye, and here is a kind of the gamble that the Russians seem to undertake. The S-300 and its evolved version S-400 are portrayed as invincible and it is also a first-class export merchandise and a subject of national pride. Purported capabilities of these systems are a display of the alleged Russian superiority in weapons technology and a part of the wider campaign designed to convince the Russian public that the current authorities are capable to defend the country surrounded and threatened by multiple enemies.

Therefore, bringing the S-300 to the situation in which it would be subject to a possible attack or even destruction, or at least it could be rendered incapable is very risky for the Russians. Possible outcomes of such a development would have very serious consequences well beyond Syria. And here is the greatest question mark. Why have the Russians decided to bring the S-300s to a likely confrontation with the hostile air force? Are they sure they will prevail? This would be a great benefit for Russia, but what if they fail? It would certainly be a serious blow to Russia’s pride, economic interests and a political weight in the Middle East and beyond. As we have already argued, it is rather difficult to foresee the outcome of the battle between the sophisticated Israeli forces and the S-300s, so it all looks like a rather dangerous gamble.

The Deployment

The delivery of the S-300s to Syria was completed, according to the Russian declarations, by 3 October 2018. On the 8th of October the TASS Agency announced, citing undisclosed source, that three batteries of S-300PM, 8 launchers each with 100 missiles per battery were duly supplied to Syria. Later on, it was clarified that the new system is the PM-2, what would suggest that before it was the equipment of one of the Russian combat regiments recently rearmed with the newly produced S-400. But the sources quoted above are unreliable and nothing in fact may be taken as face value unless verified independently, although this information is consistent with a previous statement by minister Shoigu who claimed that 49 pieces of the equipment were transported from Russia.

According to the current information, the Syrian S-300s are being deployed in the Latakia province in close vicinity of the Russian S-400 units. This location may suggest that it is bound to close only one of the usual ways of Israeli attacks that frequently come from the direction of an open sea. Closeness to the Russian units may also contribute to safety of the deployed elements which might not be attacked in order to avoid fatal mistakes. This location suggests that the Russians may have decided to augment only a portion of the Syrian air defence, while living the rest, especially an important southern part with the Damascus area vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes. Note that high mountains of the Lebanon obscure the view from Latakia of the southern part of Syria with its capital of Damacus, which greatly limits the detection range in this direction.

According to the already quoted data, four launchers have been installed in a location in the Latakia province. And only that many were presented in a short video distributed by the Russian authorities – there are neither official nor unofficial pictures of any other launcher transported recently to Syria. In the current encampment there is a space for four more launchers, the entire installation looks like a site of a single standard S-300 battery. Therefore, an important question remains: Where are the other batteries? Were they really shipped? Where are they supposed to be located?

Conclusion[i]

We think first of all that the Russians will not decide to entrust full freedom of operation of the new S-300s to Syrians. This is a logical conclusion, especially if the new systems really are the PM2s which are not a simplified export version but the Russian one, operated by their own Aerospace Forces (Воздушно-космические силы). Therefore, it is rather doubtful if Moscow has decided to train Syrians to the full capacity required to operate the acquired equipment. So, the Russians will most probably remain as a decisive link in the command chain, but the S-300s will officially be portrayed as belonging to the Syrian forces. This would mean that the delivery in question is in fact bound to augment the Russian air defences and make them more flexible in Syria. It will be controlled by the Russians and plugged into the Russian network already present in Syria.

We also think that the Russians will not be quick to deploy the new system in full. Whatever might be said officially, the S-300s in Syria are in fact the Russian asset, so the Kremlin will decide when and where to station it and will rather carefully weigh options instead of playing all the trump cards at once. We must remember that Russia’s main goal in Syria is no-one’s victory, no-one’s preeminence but the balance within the framework of a frozen conflict. Even half-a-battery, when linked into the Russian air defence system but officialy manned by the Syrians, will greatly contribute to this balance. This is because it will be able to engage Israelis without a direct attribution of such action to the Russians. On the other hand, its proximity to the Russian more powerful S-400 and its perimeter defences will make the “Syrian” S-300 a difficult target.

This situation will somehow limit Israel’s freedom of action in north-western Syria, so there will be no need to field much more than a battery in the Latakia location. On the other hand, the Israelis will be able to attack Iranian targets in the areas which they consider most important: in the central Syria and in the surroundings of Damascus, where the S-300’s umbrella will not reach. It should also be stressed that the Russian threats of jamming and otherwise interfering with Israeli attacks expressed by Shoigu were carefully worded, so they should be understood as referring to the attacks directed from the sea against targets in the Latakia province. This supports our assumptions.

All in all, it could be a kind of tacit compromise that the Russians seek and Israelis will agree on. The Syrian S-300s would not be attacked but they also would not be able to contribute to the defence of those targets which are the most important for Israel. This way the myth of S-300 omnipotence will be upheld and the Israelis will have their share of damage inflicted on Iranians. The S-300s will remain a credible deterrent as they could in future expand the zone of control or be moved to the other positions, even rapidly if necessary.

Finally, all the concerns about the delivery of the S-300s to the Syrian Arab Army is rather a bluff and a political statement addressed to the internal public and international opinion as a gesture of the Russian strength and a showcase of control over Syria. In fact, however, if the abovementioned information and interpretation are true, so far we have been witnessing only an augmentation to the Russian air defence in Syria, which makes it more flexible with regard to what kind of target it could engage. It will be just another, although highly versatile, tool of the Russian influence. This is a real game-changer within the Russian bluff but its relevance is limited.