The Mavi Vatan ("Blue Homeland") concept, which has dominated Turkish public debate in the past years, assumes that Turkey will increase its activities in the adjacent seas. In line with determinants of this strategic vision, the main goal of Turkey is to significantly expand its exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea, the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean Sea. The authorities in Ankara argue that the current delimitation of maritime boundaries is highly unjust and disregards historical and geographical conditions. Although the idea of the "Blue Homeland" was formulated in military circles at the beginning of the 21st century, it was only recently adopted as an important element of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's new foreign policy doctrine. In this context, it should be noted that the popularity of Mavi Vatan in Turkey results from the discovery of huge deposits of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean. In an attempt to justify their rights to take control over this resource, the Turks employ a whole range of diplomatic, military and propagandistic measures. Politicians of the ruling Justice and Development Party are aware that a possible access to gas deposits leads directly to a gradual independence of Turkey from the expensive imports of energy resources, which would be a huge great incentive for the economic development of the country.

Even before the official dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation had become an active international player, at least in its closest neighbourhood. After December 1991 Moscow did not possess instruments to conduct global strategies, but it was able to preserve a sphere of influence consisting of the former Soviet republics in South Caucasus (Закавказье), and part of Central Asia (Средняя Азия). Russia used several vehicles to exert its control: economic dependence, the interdependence of political elites, and the so-called frozen conflict strategy. These instruments formed an effective, flexibly implemented mix of policies which the Kremlin had been executing until its influence was stabilized in the early 1990s.

On December 13th, 2020, a news of a security breach in the unclassified networks of several government agencies swept through the media. As it soon turned out, it was one of the most perilous and sophisticated attacks the public opinion has heard of in recent years. The list of victims included many US Departments including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Cyber Security and Infrastructure Agency (CISA). At least several hundred private companies around the world were also compromised.

For many years active cyber defense measures and hacking back have been debated in the USA. The crux of the discussion is whether cybercrime victims from private sector should, in certain cases, be able to respond to an attack outside their own networks. Until now, such actions have been reserved exclusively for the law enforcement agencies, primarily the FBI. The Active Cyber Defense Certainty Act (ACDC) which is now being introduced in Congress would remove this restriction, allowing private companies to use aggressive cyber defense measures in order to identify attackers or even destroy stolen data.

Each year in summer the Polish Ministry of Justice and the Public Prosecutor General, as well as telecommunication and software companies, publish information concerning surveillance in Poland in the previous year. It is worth taking a closer look at statistics on obtaining user data, wiretapping, and correspondence control, to evaluate and illustrate forms, scale and trends of surveillance. As always with the classified activities carried out by the security apparatus, the information is scarce and often vague, and each incomplete answer is usually followed by a series of further questions and doubts.