In September 2019, the Russian intervention in Syria has entered its fifth year. Usually, it is portrayed as the successful military-political operation which gave the Kremlin a position of the main Middle Eastern power. It has also, as it is commonly believed, augmented Moscow’s international position as an influential world power. All of this is true to a certain degree; however, the situation is not as bright as it would seem, and far from being perpetuated. Of course, Russians are in Syria to stay, but their situation may not be as favourable as it appears.
ZBN Commentary no. 11 (53) / 2019
10 December 2019
In September 2019, the Russian intervention in Syria has entered its fifth year. Usually, it is portrayed as the successful military-political operation which gave the Kremlin a position of the main Middle Eastern power. It has also, as it is commonly believed, augmented Moscow’s international position as an influential world power. All of this is true to a certain degree; however, the situation is not as bright as it would seem, and far from being perpetuated. Of course, Russians are in Syria to stay, but their situation may not be as favourable as it appears.
This commentary is supposed to explore consequences of the latest developments in Syria for the Russian Federation in order to explain the limits of the Kremlin’s influence there. The main argument is that irrespective of how Moscow has managed to shore up the Bashar al-Assad regime in military terms, it does not possess viable instruments to address the issues that emerge while the bloodiest chapter of the Syrian drama is, most probably, drawing to an end.
In the photo: Kurdish demonstrators throwing stones at a Turkish military vehicle during a joint Turkish-Russian patrol near the town of Al Muabbadah in northeastern Syria.
Credit: Delil Souleiman/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images, via https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/world/middleeast/turkey-syria-kurds-death.html